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Abstract: This article examines ‘‘strategic latency,’’ a condition in which
technologies that could provide military (or economic) advantage remain
untapped. As difficult as it is to explain why certain ideas and technologies
flourish and find rapid acceptance, it is equally hard to understand
why some good ideas languish, only to be rediscovered and exploited
under other circumstances. Why is latent capacity so often dormant?
What are the indicators that latent capacity is on the verge of being
weaponized?
History is merely a list of surprises. . . . It can only prepare us to be surprised yet again.
Kurt Vonnegut, Slapstick
N
atural forces drive human ingenuity in predictable directions. Love,
curiosity, ego, and practical necessity combine to inspire great
achievements. Fear also inspires—especially for science and technol-
ogy with military applications. Whatever the original motivations, new cir-
cumstances often inspire creative thinking about new applications. Military
technologies generate spin-offs for civilian uses and vice-versa. Throughout
history, much of the latent potential of new technologies that could have
changed the world lay dormant. Today, however, an expanding list of new and
emerging technologies are fraught with strategic implications for national and
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international security. Natural forces are producing transformative technolo-
gies whose latent military potential is, or will soon be, readily available to the
strong and weak alike. If left untended, this strategic latency could lead to a
radical restructuring of world power.
The Myth of Progress
An optimistic perspective on progress pervades the popular view of
evolution, which is seen as the progressive refinement of ever-improving
species moving inexorably toward ultimate perfection. Such modern expecta-
tions for intellectual and evolutionary progress, however, overlook the cir-
cuitous, inconsistent, and sometimes retrograde processes of evolution. The
idea of scientific progress in which new knowledge moves us steadily closer to
ultimate truth is highly misleading. Greater understanding of developmental
mistakes and lapses is needed to appreciate why evolution sometimes turns a
blind eye to progress, even when such advancements hold the promise of
great power. As technology gives mankind more ways to pursue both good
and evil objectives, the occasional timely lack of progress may turn out to be
our saving grace.
Despite the clear lineages that 20-20 hindsight enables us to super-
impose on increasingly sophisticated theories, these particular pathways to
understanding were far from inevitable. Mankind could have followed alter-
nate roads of discovery and arrived at different understandings of the under-
lying facts. The laws of nature are not socially constructed, but the process of
scientific discovery is fraught with human proclivities. Modern civilization
could have been organized differently, and technology could have evolved in
very different ways. Such underlying uncertainty about the direction of science
and technology make it exceedingly difficult to predict or prepare for trans-
formative effects—even when we know they are approaching.
Philosophers of science, such as Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper,
grappled with the inherent limitations of science to maintain steady cumulative
progress toward undisputed truth. Both men expected setbacks, ‘‘knowledge-
losses.’’ when popular theories are found to have fatal flaws. Kuhn accounted
for scientific backtracking as a necessary result of his periodic scientific
revolutions, and Popper embraced the formal falsification of theories as a
main tenet of his philosophy. One thing on which they agreed was the ‘‘two
steps forward, one step back’’ pace of scientific progress, which they under-
stood follows a circuitous, non-linear, and unpredictable path.
Incremental progress is sometimes supplanted by great leaps in under-
standing, aswas the casewith Einstein’s theory of relativity or James Watson and
Francis Crick’s modeling of DNA. However, such great leaps forward have
sometimes failed to achieve liftoff and instead remained frozen in time. Archi-
medes made his breakthroughs in calculus 2000 years before Gottfried Leibniz
DAVIS
70 | Orbis
and Isaac Newton arrived at similar conclusions, and some of Leonardo
DaVinci’s most consequential inventions (parachute, tank, submarine) went
unrealized for hundreds of years. Many scientific discoveries could have yielded
dramatic results, but went unexploited for centuries. Such lapses in the con-
tinuity of knowledge may occur as the result of religion, (as was the case with
Galileo Galilei), scientific shortcomings, (as in the prolonged adherence to
theories of alchemy and phlogiston), political ideology, (illustrated by Soviet
support for Lysenko’s bogus genetics), or any number of human failings. There
is no guarantee of steady scientific progress, even when powerful incentives are
driving the discovery process. These slowdowns may actually serve a purpose.
The late Stephen J. Gould made a cottage industry of poking fun at
popular misconceptions about evolution and the notion that selective muta-
tions advance living things toward more ideal forms. Modern man, Gould
showed, is not the result of progressive improvements on our prehistoric and
less sophisticated ancestors, as depicted in the popular drawing of man’s
supposed rise from organ-grinder monkey to homo erectus. Rather, our arrival
at today’s human formula represents one possible and unlikely evolutionary
outcome among many that might have developed from our planet’s brew of
environmental challenges. Evolution is not a linear process. It lurches through
periods of boom and bust, sometimes dooming elaborately evolved creatures
and perpetuating unlikely candidates, as Gould demonstrated in his book
about the fantastic fossils found in Canada’s Burgess Shale.1 Most creatures
eventually hit the evolutionary wall and die out, but a few crack the code of
longevity. Sharks essentially stopped the ‘‘improvement’’ process, having
attained near-perfection millions of years ago. By some measures of merit,
bacteria, not man, sit atop the Earth’s hierarchy of life. There is no formula to
predict evolutionary success and no guarantee that innovation will win out—
only that successive mutations will exploit environmental conditions to
enhance prospects for long-term survival. Like scientific discovery, it is
impossible to predict evolution’s next destination. Understanding the roads
not taken poses as much of a challenge as explaining those that are docu-
mented in the fossil record—or in the history of science.
The challenge of understanding why some ideas are embraced and
operationalized for human benefit while others are not—latency—is greatly
complicated by cultural and developmental factors. Jared Diamond carries on
a tradition of macro history pioneered by historians and philosophers such as
Arnold Toynbee (A Study of History, 1934-1961) and Oswald Spengler
(Decline of the West, 1918) in his popular book, Guns, Germs and Steel,2
which seeks to explain the uneven development of the world’s civilizations.
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However, the natural sciences provide only incomplete explanations
for the myriad variations in human developmental experience. Moreover,
grafting social science interpretations onto the story of mankind as seen through
the lens of natural history introduces a plague of academic controversies that
hopelessly muddy the waters of insight. Diamond’s kluge of hard and soft
sciences presents much food for thought, but little clarity about the relationships
between the dependent and independent variables affecting comparative
human societal development. What’s missing is the messy business of politics.
Overwhelmed with data from multiple levels of analysis (individuals,
tribes, cultures, nation-states, environment, etc), macro historians resort to
logical but non-falsifiable meta theories about the rise and fall of social orders.
International relations theories suffer from similar limitations, and efforts to
inject scientific rigor and parsimony into the study of our anarchic international
society3 have not proven superior to the older traditions of political philoso-
phy. Even the biggest supercomputers armed with the most extensive data
cannot reliably predict weather, earthquakes, economic trends, or the out-
comes of sports events and political contests. A unified field theory of human
development and organization is nowhere in sight, despite continued efforts
to develop predictive models eerily reminiscent of Issac Asimov’s mathematic
‘‘psychohistory,’’ pioneered in his Foundation series.4 Perhaps with enough
data and computing power, useful patterns may someday emerge from the
annals of human behavior. So far, however, Yogi Berra’s observation that ‘‘It’s
tough to make predictions, especially about the future’’ holds true for all the
sciences.
Unsurprisingly, then, technology does not evolve in a gradual, linear,
and progressive manner. There are periods of boom and bust, great leaps
forward and prolonged droughts. This article examines ‘‘strategic latency,’’ a
condition in which technologies that could provide military (or economic)
advantage remain untapped. As difficult as it is to explain why certain ideas and
technologies flourish and find rapid acceptance, it is equally hard to understand
why some good ideas languish, only to be rediscovered and exploited under
other circumstances. Why is latent capacity so often dormant? What are the
indicators that latent capacity is on the verge of being weaponized?
Just because a tool or an idea could be applied to a problem facing
society does not mean that it will find acceptance. This is particularly relevant
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for innovations possessing obvious military applications that would give the
possessor an advantage over competitors. In the moderate state of nature
that pervades international relations, we might have seen more frequent
exploitation of powerful tools for defense purposes. Instead, latent cap-
abilities often remain so. What are the factors that determine whether ideas
or technologies will be enlisted in the quest for power? Understanding this
dynamic is the key to formulating rational responses to a world brimming
with strategic latency.
The Dogs that Didn’t Bark: Failure to Exploit Potentially Powerful
Technologies
The lure of decisive military power runs like a red skein throughout
human history. From Hannibal to Adolf Hitler, ambitious leaders sought ways
to exploit technology for conquest. We would expect nations competing in an
anarchic international system to seek advantage wherever possible. And it
comes as no surprise that military applications of new technologies often lead
the way for civilian ‘‘spin-offs.’’ Yet weapons of mass destruction—potentially
a source of decisive military power—provide numerous examples of unrea-
lized latent capability in which restraint outstripped ambition. Many countries
have possessed the wherewithal to make nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, but nearly all decided to forego their awesome potential.
Despite the extensive proliferation of nuclear technology, only nine
counties have crossed the latency threshold to acquire a nuclear arsenal. A few
came close but pulled back (Sweden, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil), and a
few like South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan reversed course and
gave up weapons they already possessed. Scores of countries operate nuclear
power reactors and even more operate research reactors that give them a
running start to pursue weapons. Many of these countries face significant
threats to their security, yet only a handful have elected to transform these
latent capabilities into powerful weapons. Many factors contribute to national
decisions about nuclear weapons, but it is notable that so much latent nuclear
capability has gone untapped for such a long time. Only the Soviet Union and
the United States gave full throttle to their nuclear potential, and those
programs are in the process of being drastically scaled back to reduce the
role of nuclear weapons in national and international security. The actual use
of nuclear weapons has become almost unthinkable. Whether the norms of
nonproliferation and non-use will persist, and for how long, goes to the heart
of the issue: latent capabilities often remain dormant until a convergence of
political forces trigger the intent to ‘‘weaponize.’’ In the case of nuclear
weapons, internal constraints combined with manipulation of external forces
by powerful nations such as the United States have successfully moderated the
weaponization of latent nuclear capabilities.
Strategic Latency and World Order
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The pattern of restraint also pervades the history of chemical and
biological weapons, which have proliferated far less than one might expect
given the ease of access to the relevant technologies and their potential
contribution to the military power of insecure and aggressive nations alike.
Even those who acquire them tend to abide by the norm of non-use. Latency in
chemical and biological technologies is even more extensive than nuclear due
to their pervasive civil applications. To be sure, the latent military potential of
chemicals has been exploited at various times throughout human history, but
these episodes have been followed by long periods (sometimes hundreds of
years) of disuse. Only a handful of countries are known to have weaponized
biological agents, although many experts remain convinced that increasing
latency in this area represents a dire threat.5 Whatever the reasons for restraint,
(cost, uncertain military utility, international norms, domestic politics, counter-
proliferation efforts) access to the technologies has not been the main limiting
factor. We must look beyond technological determinism to understand why
widespread latency has not more often been transformed into weapons, even
when such potential was accompanied by powerful motivations of survival
and conquest.
Many other technologies were, of course, rapidly adapted for military
purposes. Rocketry, radar, communications, computers, and every mode of
transportation were quickly drafted into military service. Others, however,
were not. For example, various incapacitating agents might enable a country to
render an adversary army or population senseless, delusional, and defense-
less. Such substances can be distinct from non-lethal crowd control agents
such as tear gas, but like tear gas, are not banned by the Chemical Weapons
Convention or prohibitions on biological weapons. Incapacitants could be
released into air and water supplies to defeat a population’s will to resist. HG
Wells envisioned such ‘‘pacificants’’ as a precursor to authoritarian control in
his 1933 novel Shape of Things to Come, and the villainous Goldfinger used
sleeping gas against the U.S. Army in the 1964 James Bond spy thriller bearing
his name. The use by Russian special forces of the powerful drug fentanyl to
overcome Chechen terrorists who took hundreds of hostages in a Moscow
theatre in 2002 indicates ongoing interest in incapacitants. However, despite
concerted efforts by the Soviet Union and the United States to weaponize
psychotropic mind control drugs, these programs were abandoned, and we
have not seen large-scale efforts to field weapons of mass delusion. Similarly,
the destruction of food supplies by conventional or other means has not
received the attention that one might expect.
Other potential technologies of mass effect that were not swiftly drafted
into military service include space warfare (including electromagnetic pulse),
geo-engineering, and eugenics. Whether the forces that have constrained
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strategic latency in these technologies and prevented their full exploitation for
military purposes will be tempted to reap the benefits of their military
potential depends on the intentions and motivations of the countries, groups
and individuals who posses the technologies. The pattern of restraint will be
tested.
Terrorism and Latency: Intent without Capability
Terrorists, like other proliferators, seek to circumvent the forces of
moderation that constrain the unauthorized uses of technology. Perhaps
driven by necessity, terrorists have proven to be rapid exploiters of
technology. There are many examples of terrorists finding innovative ways
to use technology, from the weaponization of commercial airliners, to
improvised explosive devices and extensive use of electronic media. Such
innovations support the terrorist’s reliance on unconventional warfare to
attack vulnerable parts of a stronger enemy. Terrorist groups are not known
to possess WMD capabilities of their own, but rather seek access to the
latent capabilities derived from the industrial infrastructure of nation states.
Nevertheless, a few groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda, have tried
to make chemical weapons using their own small-scale production units.
Whether these types of organizations have the wherewithal to produce
WMD may depend on their knowledge of—and access to—emerging
technologies such as small batch chemical processing that could give them
capabilities to match their intentions. We should at the very least expect
them to try.
It remains to be seen how terrorist possession or use of WMD might
affect the latency calculations of those they threaten. However, we already
have seen extensive efforts to increase the security of latent capabilities such as
nuclear power plants, air travel, chemical factories, and the handling of
biological agents. Terrorists have drawn attention to the destructive potential
of latent technologies and triggered new interest in research and development
on ways to defend against unauthorized access. Concern about terrorist
interest in toxins and pathogens has also spurred research in disease detection
and vaccinations. Such research may blur the distinction between offensive
and defensive capabilities, even raising suspicions about the true intent behind
intensive R&D on certain biological agents and toxins.
By raising concerns about the possible unauthorized weaponization of
latent capabilities, terrorists have already forced attention and resources to be
directed on the physical protection of latent technologies, and also on
defending against their possible use by terrorists should they succeed in
acquiring them. The very existence of the Department of Homeland Security
reflects the seriousness with which this threat is viewed. Terrorists have
already inspired new thinking about latency.
Strategic Latency and World Order
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Through a Glass Darkly: Can Latency Be Controlled?
Whether we dwell on the promise or the peril created by technology is
a personal judgment. Modern-day Luddites, such as the Unibomber, focus on
the dangers inherent in technology, while techno-optimists tend to see
scientific progress as a cure-all for everything that ails the human condition.
Contentious issues pit the two sides against one another, with both arguing on
behalf of the betterment of mankind. For example, technology pessimists see
genetically modified organisms (‘‘Frankenfood’’) leading to global disaster,
while proponents see abundant food stocks to feed starving children. Stem cell
researchers see miracle cures to ease suffering, while opponents fear a slippery
slope to a science fiction nightmare of human cloning. Nuclear fusion
advocates hope to realize the dream of energy ‘‘too cheap to meter,’’ while
critics fear a next generation of nuclear weapons.
Governments employ various policy instruments to regulate inter-
national markets for such dual-use technologies. The goal of unilateral and
multilateral export controls is to ensure that goods and services that could be
used for military applications are sold only to countries, companies, and
individuals who pledge not to do so. National and international export
controls evolved around the proliferation of technologies underlying
nuclear energy, industrial chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, which give the
possessor inherent capabilities to produce weapons of mass destruction.
Once such capabilities have been transferred, however, the effectiveness of
technology controls depends on the intentions of the receiver. Pessimists,
therefore, tend to err on the side of caution when exporting dangerous
technologies, even at the expense of good relations and lucrative export
deals. Optimists split into two camps: fatalists who see efforts to control the
spread of technology as futile (‘‘If we don’t sell it, someone else will.’’), and
true believers who expect the net benefits of high-tech trade to outweigh any
negative consequences.
Export controls have been effective, despite their shortcomings.
Restricting access to WMD-related goods and services is common sense,
especially in cases where the intent to acquire WMD is clear. Regulating trade
in dual-use goods also provides insight into the willingness of buyers to abide
by the rules and conditions established for safe, civilian use of potentially
dangerous technologies. Conversely, efforts to evade controls serve as a sign
of bad intentions. However, governments are losing control over critical
technologies they once monopolized. Global supply chains and sophisticated
proliferation networks already traffic in nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons materials and expertise, easily circumventing governmental controls.
Moreover, new technologies are no longer ‘‘born secret’’ in a Manhattan
Project-like incubator. More often they originate from the private sector,
outside of government auspices. Instead of lording over technology transfers,
governments are playing catch up trying to monitor and understand the
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implications of the latest developments in science and technology. Latency is
overwhelming the bonds that once held it in check.
Cultivating Latency as a Strategic Hedge
Greater understanding of latency may ultimately lead to the emergence
of advanced forms of intentional latency in which the potential offensive and
defensive applications of various technologies has been explicitly explored,
but not fully operationalized. Such hedging, in which the necessary technol-
ogy and supporting infrastructure for military applications are in place, but
without crossing the line separating civilian and military use, might reflect a
strategy to have WMD options close at hand without triggering regional and
international concerns.
Japan’s nuclear program provides an apt example of a country that
possesses advanced nuclear capabilities that put them ‘‘a few screwdriver
turns’’ away from possessing nuclear weapons. Yet it still boasts its sterling
nonproliferation credentials. Few would argue that Japan’s ready access to
plutonium and its civilian missile program are completely unrelated to Tokyo’s
concept of national security, despite protestations to the contrary. With latent
nuclear capabilities poised on the line dividing civilian and military applica-
tions, continued confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella to deter historic
adversaries such as Korea and China may determine whether Japan’s latent
capabilities stay that way. Other countries may develop advanced chemical
and biological industries that provide them with similar options.
Such hedging strategies may increasingly describe the status of emer-
ging and disruptive technologies in many countries. With WMD and other
high-leverage capabilities within reach, understanding the intentions of coun-
tries, leaders, and organizations will offer the last remaining hope for dis-
suading or deterring decisions to weaponize, proliferate or attack.
Future Shock: Latency and the Emergence of New Threats
In spite of the foregoing discussion about the difficulties of prediction,
some new and emerging technologies will be exploited for strategic pur-
poses—probably in unexpected ways. A few critical dual-use technologies
now hang in the balance—already deeply embedded in modern society and
temptingly latent with destructive potential. International standards for their
use are weak and eroding. These latent technologies are near the ‘‘tipping
point’’ and could easily serve man’s lesser angels.
Tragedy of the Global Cyber Commons
The creeping omnipresence of interconnected electronic media
already pervades peace and war. Chinese hacking of Google in 2010 illustrates
Strategic Latency and World Order
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the shrinking relevance of the boundaries that formerly separated countries,
organizations, machines, and people. Electronic globalization wiped out
distinctions between public and private, peace and war. Cyber warfare among
nation states is a done deal, and international criminal enterprises long ago
followed legitimate businesses in adopting the latest cyber technologies.
Networks of networks pervade social, business and political interactions.
What is still emerging is the large-scale manipulation of advanced cyber
warfare techniques by terrorists and other non-governmental entities.
Moving beyond the use of electronic media for communications,
propaganda, procurement, recruiting and simple operational applications
such as triggering explosives, terrorists are trying to get the most bang for
the buck from the electronic interconnectedness that links them to their
enemies, including everything from major infrastructure to our everyday
appliances. Terrorists already hack into the surveillance video from U.S. spy
drones, and the November 2008 Mumbai attackers incorporated email, internet,
GPS navigation, BlackBerrys, satellite imagery, and live TV coverage into their
plan.6 How long before terrorists wield state-like cyber warfare capabilities?
International norms lag far behind technology in the cyber arena,
which increasingly looks more like a mixed martial arts brawl than a global
community. Proposals for a convention to limit cyber warfare7 may offer too
little too late to rein in these trends. While it was arguably inevitable that
countries would attack one another’s electronic infrastructure, it is disconcert-
ing that nation states may be powerless to stop criminals, ideologues and
cranks from turning our phones, cars and refrigerators against us.
Star Wars, Star Peace and Extra Terrestrial Governance
Despite mankind’s longstanding preoccupation with fighting in the
high frontier and our growing capabilities to realize those dreams, a surprising
measure of restraint has left the heavens largely peaceful. The initial space race
was more about fighting the Cold War back on Earth than dominating the astral
plains, although Washington and Moscow certainly kept their options open for
future space conflict.
Space is still mostly peaceful, in part due to the emergence of inter-
national norms against the prosecution of warfare in and above the Earth’s
atmosphere. To prevent nuclear proliferation in space, the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty prohibited stationing nuclear weapons in space or on the moon, or
tampering with another country’s space assets. Yet, the treaty does not
constrain the use of space to support Earth-bound military and intelligence
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activities. Even defensive initiatives such as President Ronald Reagan’s Star
Wars program and the George W. Bush administration’s emphasis on missile
defense met with strong domestic and international opposition. However,
China’s shoot-down of one of its own satellites in 2007, followed in 2008 by a
similar U.S. shoot-down of an ailing spy satellite prompted renewed fears of a
new competition for space dominance.
Orbital space is getting dangerously crowded. New space-faring
nations such as China, India, and Japan, (and wannabes like Iran and North
Korea) are projecting earthly rivalries into the extra-terrestrial commons.
Accumulating space-junk threatens to clobber satellites in orbit while new
capabilities such as micro-satellites, ground and space-based laser weapons,
and space tourism add to the challenge of governing Earth’s anarchic space
neighborhood. With no slow-down in the development of new space cap-
abilities by more countries (and even non-governmental organizations), calls
to strengthen the norms of space etiquette through treaties and agreements
face an uphill battle.8
Let My People Go: Geo-Engineering for Fun and Profit
Man’s desire to command the forces of nature is well documented.
Following in the footsteps of Moses, Soviet and American scientists experi-
mented with Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs), as a means to excavate
harbors and reroute rivers. The Nonproliferation Treaty explicitly protected
the right to conduct PNEs. So far, nation states have exercised caution
regarding possible unintended consequences of large-scale environmental
tampering. However, concerns about global climate change could change the
way people think about geo-engineering—especially if such schemes promise
to benefit politically popular species and habitats. What if cloud seeding could
preserve Arctic ice, the disappearing habitat of the endangered Polar Bear?
Could we alter the direction of hurricanes or change the chemistry of seas and
lakes to halt the growth of undesirable or invasive plants and animals? And,
from a military perspective, what if manipulating the weather, seas, or geology
could help defeat an enemy? These ideas are not new, but the technology and
politics of large-scale geo-engineering are changing. International concerns
about climate change could create new constituencies among environmen-
talists, who might view the injection of particulates into the atmosphere as a
reasonable way to reduce global warming, or even avoid conflicts that might
result from environmental problems such as rising sea levels.9 Economic
incentives to reduce greenhouse gases could drive countries or companies
Strategic Latency and World Order
8 Clay Moltz, ‘‘Space Jam,’’ The New York Times, February 18, 2009.
9 National Intelligence Council, The Impact of Climate Change to 2030, http://www.dni.gov/
nic/special_climate2030.html.
Winter 2011 | 79
to employ geo-engineering techniques to offset their own environmental
footprints.
International norms against massive manipulation of the global com-
mons are weak. A 1978 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
banned large-scale geo-engineering for warfare, but lacks monitoring or
enforcement mechanisms. Nevertheless, the Law of the Sea Treaty, various
international fishing conventions, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (which bans
nuclear testing in the atmosphere), and other global environmental agree-
ments provide examples of how sovereign rights can be balanced with mutual
interests in global governance. Techniques such as cloud seeding, illustrated
by Beijing’s conjuring of the weather before the 2008 Olympics, intentional
fish kills, and overseas waste dumping are already common practice. It is not
hard to imagine how sovereign or corporate decisions to modify shared
environmental resources could provoke conflict, not to mention the wrath
of Mother Nature.
Every Man a King: The Democratization of Advanced Science and
Technology
Recent trends in science and technology are poised to revolutionize
national and international security. Rapid progress in fields such as nano-
technology, bioengineering, and advanced materials are making it possible to
model and manipulate materials at the atomic level. It is now possible to
design and build custom molecules that can be constructed like Legos.
Distinctions that used to separate fields such as biology and chemistry have
all but disappeared. New tools and new materials are inevitably finding
applications in medicine, energy, communications, and, of course, warfare.
For good or evil, scientific progress is creating new forms of latent weapon
potential. We have yet to come to terms with the meaning of this most recent
scientific revolution.
Even more than the overall march of scientific progress itself, current
trends in micro-level research and manufacturing are making it possible to
design and produce extremely sophisticated materials and products on a very
small scale.10 Manufacturers in fields such as the pharmaceutical industry have
adoptedmicro-processing techniques to produce small quantities of specialized
chemicals that replace the need to buy and store unwieldy stocks of dangerous
items. The ability toproduceprecisequantities of specialtymaterials limits safety
and security liabilities and enables production of just-in-time inventories. The
implications for proliferation are clear: small-scale production units are easier to
hide. However, the emergenceofmicro-batchmanufacturing also puts the fruits
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of large-scale R&D that were formerly available only to established, well-funded
institutions such as governments, universities, and industry within the reach of
Joe Six Pack. Capabilities once reserved for powerful institutions have trickled
down to everyman.
Recent innovations in micro manufacturing techniques put powerful,
computer-aided design (CAD) and computer numerically controlled (CNC)
machine tools in the hands of individual do-it-yourselfers (DIY). The implica-
tions for access to WMD are unsettling. Micro batch processing is a boon for
small-scale brewers of beer and spirits, but might also give countries and/or
individuals the ability to produce chemical or biological weapons without an
associated industrial base. What other materials might be designed, produced
and fabricated using these tools? Mad at the government or feuding with your
neighbors? You too can produce your own personal WMD.
A.Q. Khan’s notorious network demonstrated how proliferators were
able to utilize modern global business practices (such as offshore production
and global supply chain) to sell do-it-yourself nuclear weapons kits to Libya,
North Korea, and Iran. If AQ Khan represented the Walmart model of
proliferation, micro-level manufacturing represents a ‘‘mom and pop’’
approach to WMD. We are approaching a threshold in which individuals
and groups can cut out the middle men and seize the full power of modern
R&D, manufacturing, and distribution methods to acquire advanced weapon
capabilities. With strategic latency fully democratized, it is unclear if any form
of governance can restrain the free market.
Governance and the Global Commons
When C.P. Snow wrote about the culture clash between the sciences
and the humanities, he was mainly interested in how those two groups of
intellectuals were thinking about the impact of technology on society. Not only
were the two groups not communicating with each other, they were not
applying their collective talents to understand and manage the potential for
conflict and cooperation that new technologies were forcing on a fragile Cold
War world. Like other noted scientists of his time, Snow warned that in the
nuclear age, our failure to understand the nexus of technology and security
had become down right dangerous. Today, strategic latency presents us with
another such challenge.
Even with our limited predictive skills, it is clear that transformative
technologies in cyber, space, lasers, and geo-engineering have crossed the
tipping point. We can’t say we didn’t see their security consequences coming.
More technologies hang in the balance, their latent power increasingly
available to serve the desires of a growing cast of characters. However, a
review of history suggests that worst case scenarios based on negative
assumptions about technological determinism and crude political realism
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seldom come to pass. What is more likely is a prolonged state of advancing
latency.
We can take comfort from the restraint that has governed the militar-
ization of some of the most consequential technologies. Our understanding of
the complex forces underlying such restraint is insufficient to draw conclu-
sions about the management of new and emerging technologies. We simply
cannot predict which discoveries, which latent capabilities, will strike the right
chord to emerge as game changers for world history. Yet the incentives and
motivations to know the future of latency could not be stronger. We can rely
on powerful forces (companies, citizens, politicians, NGOs, venture capitalists,
researchers, and power-hungry leaders) to ferret out every opportunity to
profit from emerging technology. We cannot stop the march of technology or
end mankind’s desire for power, but it may be possible to moderate the
consequences of strategic latency and its effects on domestic and international
security.
Restraint and Transparency
One way to avoid arms racing and promote caution regarding the uses
of new technologies for military purposes is for the countries that possess the
capabilities to exercise restraint in their weaponization. Unrealized latency is
usually less threatening than fully expressed military capability. Conversely,
pressing one’s technology advantage can drive an adversary to take precipi-
tous actions. Along the same lines, transparency can be a useful way to convey
peaceful intentions and ease suspicions. Cooperative threat reduction pro-
grams started at the end of the Cold War to assist post-Soviet states retire
unwanted WMD, which laid the foundation for extensive international colla-
boration in legitimate but WMD-related research. Cooperative research in
certain emerging and disruptive technologies might help to confirm restraint
on all sides and alleviate pressures to develop unnecessary countermeasures
and hedge strategies. Unfortunately, restraint in the cyber and space arenas
appears to be eroding, but it’s not too late for other technologies.
Norms. To avoid a free-for-all in which countries and individuals
recklessly exploit innovative technologies without regard for adverse con-
sequences, norms that already govern domestic and international behavior
should be applied to latent capabilities. At the international level, existing
norms against the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons provide a
useful model. Even without new treaties and institutions, leaders can establish
expectations that delegitimize the military uses of certain emerging and
disruptive technologies. Some emerging technologies such as nanotechnology
are certain to have global consequences that merit common international
understandings, if not regulation. Such norms do not prevent the creation or
possession of new weapons, and enforcement is problematic. However, it is
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nonetheless useful to stigmatize their use, thereby relegating them to a special
category requiring a positive decision to defy internationally held beliefs about
the legitimacy of certain weapons. It is also possible to develop expectations
for punishment of offenders. Domestically, governments should promulgate
tough laws against unauthorized acquisition and use of weapons of mass
destruction or disruption as these capabilities fall into the hands of every man.
Global Governance. The natural forces of restraint—supported by
foreign policy and diplomacy—have proved somewhat effective in the manage-
ment of transformative technologies. The nuclear nonproliferation regime
illustrates how strategic latency can be managed internationally. However,
other technology issues with similarly significant consequences for the global
commons have proven more difficult to manage in modern times. Current
debates over climate change and other global concerns show how the inter-
national system has changed since the old governance regimes such as the
Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the entire
UnitedNations systemwere createdaspart of thepostWorldWar II international
order. Rising powers such as Iran, India, Brazil and China are challenging the
legitimacy of those mechanisms and their preferable treatment of the progeni-
tors of the old system. These countries and their populations are less inclined
than ever to accept constraints on their uses of technology to advance their
interests, especially if those constraints come from those they perceive to have
already benefitted from unfair advantages.
If there is a future for global governance of technology, unprecedented
incentives would be indispensible. The payoff for restraint must be tangible,
immediate and lasting. The Atoms for Peace/NPT bargain (access to technol-
ogy in return for non-militarization) offers lessons on the benefits and perils of
such an approach. However, even strong positive and negative incentives are
not enough to dissuade the highly motivated from crossing the line from
latency to weaponry. And without a Leviathan to enforce the rules of a new
order, we should not expect future bargains to prevent the coming surge of
strategic latency from reshaping the distribution of global power. In the end,
the most important factor determining whether nations decide to exercise their
latency options will be protecting their own national security. Nothing will
drive latency toward weaponization faster than an international environment
that breeds insecurity and causes nations to seek the capabilities necessary to
protect themselves against aggression.
The Best of All Possible Worlds?
The unpredictable nature of man’s relationship with technology
underscores the uneven, retrograde and serendipitous nature of progress,
which manifests in many forms and guises. Periods of stagnation and back-
wardness can be a blessing by providing breathing room to adapt. More than
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ever, we need downtime to recoup, rethink, and acclimate to our changed
circumstances as pervasive strategic latency channels tremendous power
throughout the international system. How we respond to these circumstances
will determine our collective fate. However, the scope and pace of techno-
logical change may have overtaken our current evolutionary ability to com-
prehend and adapt to these challenges. In this case, failure is an option, one
that may expose the Earth and everything on it to a very different set of survival
challenges than we face today. For example, wars fought with emerging and
disruptive technologies, involving non-state actors, could radically alter poli-
tical, physical, environmental, and psychological conditions worldwide. It is
also possible that a great technological leap forward in energy, food produc-
tion, or health might ease the causes of conflict and foment an era of peace and
prosperity. The challenge is to court the positive benefits of scientific discovery
without, as C.P. Snow said, letting it ‘‘stab you in the back.’’ We should try to
keep strategic latency as latent as possible for as long as possible.
Einstein famously quipped that ‘‘the release of atom power has
changed everything except our way of thinking.’’ Humankind, he and others
feared, was in danger of flaming out like one of Gould’s tragically doomed
species. Yet world leaders after the World War II acted quickly to rebuild a
global order—one that accommodated new thinking about weapons and
capabilities that could instantaneously destroy cities and countries. For all its
shortcomings, the Cold War was a period of unprecedented peace and
prosperity. Leaders rose to the challenge. However, the structure and institu-
tions of the old order are sagging and in need of repair. By giving great power
to those who wish to hasten the demise of the post World War II world order,
unleashing the military and economic potential of widespread strategic latency
could have revolutionary consequences. Whether such creative destruction
constitutes progress will likely be viewed differently by the winners and losers
in a reconfigured international alignment.
Amongst this whirlwind of technological and political change, one
central variable remains steady: human nature. There is a temporal mismatch
between the scope and pace of the progress produced by human ingenuity
and the pace of evolutionary adaptation to the changes in our environment.
Our poor hunter-gatherer brains are still struggling to catch up with the past
few thousand years of technology. However, we have the advantage of being
familiar with human nature and its foibles. In St. Augustine’s words, ‘‘This is the
very perfection of a man, to find out his own imperfections.’’ We can take heart
in our proven ability to build security arrangements that protect peaceful
populations from aggression. Strategic latency demands progress in
governance, but does not change what we already know about
ourselves.
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